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CONFLICTING FIDUCIARY DUTIES
WITHIN COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
CONFERENCES: A PRESCRIPTION
FOR LENIENCY
Abstract: The 2003-05 migration of three universities from the Big East
Conference to the Atlantic Coast Conference prompted several remain-
ing Big East schools to sue the departing schools, alleging the departure
constituted a breach of the fiduciary duties the university officials owed
to the Big East Conference. This Note examines potential breach of
fiduciary duty claims in the context of athletic conference migration,
and explores how conflicts of interest can arise in such situations be-
cause university representatives owe fiduciary duties both to their own
universities and to the conference. This Note first contends that, absent
clear evidence of intent to harm a conference and its members, breach-
of-duty claims against university officials following athletic conference
departures should be viewed with skepticism. In such 'situations, univer-
sity representatives should be considered university officials first, and
conference board members second, since conference memberships are
only a part of the job of being a university official. This Note also argues
that any damages from departure sustained by the remaining schools
should be subsumed into withdrawal fees contractually established
within conference constitutions, thus allowing universities to resolve
conference conflicts quickly and without resort to the court system.
INTRODUCTION
When Rutgers played Princeton University in the first college foot-
ball game on November 6, 1869, it was doubtful that any of the partici-
pants could have foreseen the massive revenue-creating machine college
football would become.' Today, college football annually generates $5
billion in revenue. 2 In 2003, 40.6 million fans attended college football
games and events. 5 Intercollegiate competition has turned into big
business; television rights alone for college football and basketball
See Rutgers Football, It Started Here—The First Intercollegiate Game, http://www.
scarletknights.com/football/history/fitst_ganie.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2006). Rutgers won
the game, 6 to 4. Id.
2 Rick Harrow, College Football: Search for Revenues, Protection for Athletes, CBS SPORTSLINH.
COM , Sept. 30, 2004, littp://cbs.sportsline.com/general/story/7741
 030.
3 Id.
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games generate nearly $700 million for schools and conferences. 4 Be-
cause of the huge sums of money at stake in college athletics today, any
perceived threat to a university's football revenue can lead a school to
take action in pursuit of greater profit.&
In particular, colleges and universities may be drawn to the po-
tential revenue-boosting opportunities presented by migrating from
one athletic conference to another, even though such movement also
carries financial ramifications for the conferences and other schools
involved.6 Although the switching of conference allegiances is not his-
torically atypical, 7 the revenue-generating potential for the major con-
ferences today creates high stakes for those involved. 8 Thus, the 2003—
05 departures of the University of Miami ("Miami"), Boston College,
and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University ("Virginia
Tech") from the Big East Conference (the "Big East") to the Atlantic
Coast Conference (the "ACC") resulted in a significant degree of bit-
terness9 and several lawsuits,m despite the payment of $1 million with-
drawal penalties by the departing schools."
The Big East, an association of colleges formed under the Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association (the "NCAA") to conduct ath-
letic competitions between Big East member schools, is organized as a
nonprofit corporation. 12 As such, members of the Big East have
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the conference itself and poten-
tially to the other members as well." A claim in one of the lawsuits
4 Rick Horrow, College Football: Return of the Humans, CBS SNORTSLINE.COM , Oct. 22,
2004, http://cbs.sportsline.com/general/story/7818325.
5 See Horrow, supra note 2.
6 See id.
7 Steve Wieberg, The Complications of Conference Calls, USA TooAv, Nov. 4, 2003, at 8C,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/col lege/other/2003-11-03-realignment x.hun.
" See Horrow, supra note 2.
9
 See NCAA Basketball Recap: (8) Connecticut 63, Boston College 58, SI.com , Jan. 31, 2004,
httpl/sportsillustrated.cnn.com/baskethall/ncaa/men/recaps/2004/01/31/7849_recap,
html. After Boston College accepted an invitation to join the ACC, Connecticut men's
basketball coach Jim Calhoun remarked that he would refuse to schedule Boston College
as a basketball, opponent in the future. See id.
1 ° See infra notes 106-20 and accompanying text.
" Michael Vega, BC Accepts an Invitation to Join the ACC: Big East Officials Unhappy as Eagles
Prepare to Fly, BOSTON GI.ORE, Oct. 13, 2003, at Fl (Miami and Virginia Tech payments); Con-
ferences Schedule Games as Part of Settlement, ESPN.coM, May 4, 2005, littp://sports.espn.go.
com/ncaa/news/story?id=2052787 [hereinafter Conferences Schedule Games] (Boston College
payment).
12 Trs. of Boston Coll. v. Big East Conference, 18 Mass. L. Rptr. 177, 178 (Super. Ct.
2004).
19 See infra notes 155-72 and accompanying text.
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related to the recent conference migrations alleged a breach of
fiduciary duty by the departing schools." In short, the claim asserted
that the departing schools owed fiduciary duties to other members of
the Big East, which they breached by engaging in talks with the ACC
about transferring to the ACC while at the same time reassuring the
other members of the Big East that such a transfer would not occur. 15
This Note examines the claim of breach of fiduciary duty by the
schools that •migrated from the Big East to the ACC and analyzes the
handling of similar claims in the future. 16 Part I of this Note reviews the
organization of major college football and discusses the history and
role of conferences in intercollegiate athletics.° Part II details the dis-
pute between the Big East and the ACC and the ramifications of the
school migration between conferences. 16
 Fart III discusses the lawsuits
involved in the Big East-ACC dispute, focusing on the claim for breach
of fiduciary duty. 19 Part IV discusses the fiduciary duties owed by a di-
rector or officer of a nonprofit corporation such as an athletic confer-
ence, examines duties that are based on the relationship between uni-
versity administrators and their students, and sets out the potential for
conflicts between these duties." Part V discusses the competing
fiduciary interests at play in the Big East—ACC dispute and recom-
mends a deferential approach to administrators' actions in similar fu-
ture conflicts. 21 Finally, Part VI recommends that any damages resulting
from a potential breach of fiduciary duty in similar situations should be
considered as subsumed in any withdrawal fee paid by the schools upon
departure from the conference. 22
I. MAJOR COLLEGE FOOTBALL: BACKGROUND OF THE DISPUTE
Having a working knowledge of the structure, history, and compo-
nents of major college football is crucial to understanding the motiva-
tion behind the lawsuits that arose out of the defections from the Big
14 See Complaint for Monetary Damages and Injunctive Relief at 6, Univ. of Conn. v
Univ. of Miami, No. TTD-CV-03-0081757-S (Conn. Super. Ct. June 6, 2003) thereinafter
Complaint], available at http://www.ct.gov/governorrowland/lib/governorrowland/down-
loads/060603.pdf;
 infra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 229-67 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 23-58 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 59-105 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 106-34 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 135-228 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 229-55 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 256-67 and accompanying text.
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East to the ACC.23
 The revenue-generating powerhouse that is major
college football today can lead to disputes regarding huge amounts of
money, such as the situation involving the Big East and the ACC. 24
A. Structure of Major College Football
Major college football is governed by the NCAA, which is a volun-
tary organization through which universities and colleges regulate their
athletic progiams. 23
 The NCAA is comprised of more than 1250 institu-
tions, conferences, organizations, and individuals. 26
 Within the larger
framework of the NCAA, entities known as conferences provide further
structure to intercollegiate athletics. 27
 Conferences are associations of
NCAA-member schools that conduct competitions among their mem-
bers and determine a conference champion in one or more sports. 28
Conferences are structured in different ways; the Big East29
 and
the Big Ten conferences (the "Big Ten" ),30
 for example, are struc-
tured as not-for-profit corporations, whereas the ACC is structured as
a tax-exempt unincorporated membership organization . 31
 Member
universities of conferences generally share common missions, prac-
tices, and policies for the benefit of the universities and their student-
athletes. 32
 They often have a common purpose (eight of the eleven
Big Ten schools" are land-grant research institutions) or common
23 See infra notes 25-105 and accompanying text.
24
 See infra notes 25-105 and accompanying text.
29
 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, About the NCAA, http://www2.ncaa.org/about
iicaa/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
26 Id.
27 See GLENN M. WONG, ESSENTIALS OF AMATEUR SPORTS LAW 183 (2d ed. 1994).
28 Id.; Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, NCAA Membership Breakdown, Sept. 1, 2005,
littp://wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/membership_svcs/member-ship_breakdown.html.
29
 Trs. of Boston Coll. v. Big East Conference, 18 Mass. L. Rptr. 177, 178 (Super. Ct.
2004).
2° See Brainy Encyclopedia, Big Ten Conference, http://www.brainyencyclopedia.com/
encyclopedia/b/bi/hig_ten_conference.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
31 Complaint, supra note 14, at 6.
" See Big Ten Conference Official Athletic Site, On Campus, About the Conference,
http://bigten.collegesports.com/school-bio/big10-school-bio.html
 (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
83
 Big Ten Conference, Official Athletic Site, Traditions, Big Ten History, http://big-
ten.collegesports.coni/trads/bigl0-trads.html
 (last visited Feb. 9, 2006). Although the con-
ference is named the Big Ten, it does in fact have eleven member schools. Id. From 1949
until 1990, the conference had ten members. Id. Upon admitting Pennsylvania State Uni-
versity in 1990, the conference retained its name, despite having increased its size to
eleven members. Id.
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geography. 34 One function of a conference is to promote, publicize,
and market the teams of its member universities." The conference
can do this in a number of ways, including the lucrative practice of
negotiating television broadcast contracts with large networks such as
ABC, CBS, and ESPN." These and other financial relationships cre-
ated by NCAA conferences are a major source of the litigation be-
tween the remaining Big East schools and the departing schools."
Legal issues have often arisen in intercollegiate athletics as a re-
sult of the rule-making and enforcement activities of associations such
as the NCAA and conferences such as the Big East." Institutions of
higher learning have sued conferences and associations over their
rules, policies, or decisions." The phenomenon of conference migra-
tion, although most publicized during the recent Big East to ACC
shift, has been present for many years. 4° In fact, an examination of the
history of conferences demonstrates that these school movements be-
tween conferences occur periodically."
B. History of School Movement Between Conferences
Some conferences have existed for more than 100 years, whereas
others are much younger. 42
 Expansion and realignment of conferences
is not a one-time phenomenon; between 1990 and 2002, 34 schools mi-
grated from one conference to another. 43
Many conference realignments are accomplished without litiga-
tion." There is, however, at least one example of schools using the
54 See Nat'l Ass'n of State Univs. & Land-Grant Coils., What is a Land-Grant College?
http://www.nasulgc.org/publications/Land_Grant/land.htm
 (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).
	 .
3$ See BigEasi.org, About the Big East, http://www.bigeast.org/school-hio/bige-school-
bio.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
5° See id.
57 See infra notes 80-105 and accompanying text.
Wtt.LiAnt A. KAPt.tN & BARBARA A. LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION: A COM-
PREHENSIVE GUIDE TO LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION MAKING 894
(3d ed. 1995). See generally NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988); Arlosoroff v. NCAA,
746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984).
39
 KArt.tN & LEE, supra note 38, at 894. See generally NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S.
85 (1984).
40
 See. Wieberg, supra note 7, at 8C.
41 See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
42 Compare Big Ten Conference, supra note 32 (noting that the Big Ten was founded in
1896), with Official Site of Conference USA, C-USA Milestones, littp://conferellCellSa.
ccillegesports.com/ot/c-usa-milestones.html
 (last visited Feb. 9, 2006) (noting that Con-
ference USA was created in 1995).
43 See Wieberg, supra note 7, at 8C.
44 See id.
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court system to resolve conference organizational disputes before the
recent Big East litigation. 45
 In 1995, five of the seven teams in the Metro
Conference sought to combine with members of the Great Midwest
Conference to form Conference USA." Two members of the Metro
Conference that were to be left out of Conference USA—Virginia Tech
and Virginia Commonwealth University—sued the defecting universi-
ties.47
 They claimed that by seeking to form a new conference, the other
schools were effectively withdrawing from the Metro Conference and
thus each owed the conference the contractually established $500,000
withdrawal penalty. 48
 Although this lawsuit was settled before trial, it
demonstrates how conference migration disputes have previously led to
litigation in intercollegiate athletics."
C. The Big East Conference
Formed in 1979, the Big East organized the championships of
seven sports, not including football, among its seven initial member
universities." In an effort to band together the major football-playing
eastern independents, which were colleges and universities lacking
conference affiliations, the Big East Football Conference, a separate
entity from the Big East Conference, 51
 was formed on February 5,
45 Eric Crawford, Long, Strange Trip Continues, COURIER-i. (Louisville, Ky.), Nov. 5, 2003,
at 04G, available at http://www.courier-journal.com/cjsports/news2003/11/05bigeast/big-
4-east-old-7013.11unl.
Torn Robinson, VCU, Virginia 'Lich Sue Metal. They're Seeking An Injunction Against Being
Kicked Out of the Conference, VIRC1NIAN-PILOT, Jan. 19, 1995, at C3, available at hup://scholar.
lib.vtedu/VA-news/VA-Pilot/issues/1995/vp950119/01190494.1um; Tech, VCU File Lawsuit
Against Metro Conference, VA. 'truth SPECTRUM, Jan. 26, 1995, available at hup://scholaelib.
viedu/vtpubs/spectrum/sp950126/1c.li
47
 Va. Commonwealth Univ. v. Metro. Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. CL95A00110-00,
(Richmond City, Va. Cir. Court filed Jan. 17, 1995); Tech, VCU File Lawsuit Against Metro
Conference, supra note 46; Robinson, supra note 46.
45
 Tech, VCU File Lawsuit Against Metro Conference, supra note 46; Robinson, supra note 46.
49 See Crawford, supra note 45, at 04G.
" BigEast.org, supra note 35. The inaugural members of the Big East Conference were
Boston College, University of Connecticut, Georgetown University, Providence College, Se-
ton Hall University, St. John's University, and Syracuse University. BigEast.org, supra note 35.
The seven men's sports initially governed by the Big East Conference were basketball, tennis,
outdoor track, indoor track, cross-country, golf, and swimming and diving. BigEast.
org, Record Center, http://www.bigeast.org/ot/bige-records.html
 (last visited Feb. 9, 2006)
(links to each of the championship results or listings under each sport—Men's Basketball,
Cross Country, Golf, Swimming and Diving, Men's Tennis, Men's Indoor Track & Field, and
Men's Outdoor Track & Field—reveal that these seven sports were the only ones with cham-
pionships held in the first academic year of the Big East's existence, 1979-80).
51
 See Complaint, supra note 14, at 2. The inaugural members of the Big East Football
Conference were Miami, Syracuse, West Virginia, Boston College, Virginia Tech, Pitts-
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1991.52
 In 2000, the Big East Football Conference and the Big East
Conference merged to form one entity. 53
 The Big East, after its rea-
lignment in 2005, is composed of eight football teams 54
 and sixteen
basketball teams, in addition to teams for other sports. 55
 In total, it cur-
rently governs twenty-three championship sports." The Big East, as a
not-for-profit corporation, is governed by a board of directors. 57 Big
East member schools have representatives who serve on this board. 58
II. DEPARTURES FROM THE BIG EAST AND THE RESULTING
RIPPLE EFFECT
A. Anatomy and Asserted Rationale of the Departure
Although rumors of Miami moving to the ACC surfaced in 1999,
the first official announcement of the ACC's interest in admitting some
of the Big East schools to its membership came on May 16, 2003, when
the ACC announced that it was entering into formal discussions with
Boston College, Miami, and Syracuse University ("Syracuse") regarding
potential membership in the ACC.59
 After several weeks of meetings, on
June 25, 2003, the ACC invited Miami and Virginia Tech to join its nine
member universities." Virginia Tech accepted the invitation on June
burgh, Rutgers, and Temple. See Dustin Dow, A Snapshot of the Big East Conference and Its
Members in 2005, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 5, 2003, at 4C.
"Mark Asher, Big East Football Set for Upcoming Season, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1991, at F3.
55
 Complaint, supra note 14, at 2.
54 Mike Mitchell, College Football Landscape Will Change Drastically with Realignment for
2005, C. FOOTBALL POLL, Mar. 18, 2005, bup://www.collegefootballpoll.com/2005_con-
ferences.litml.
55
 Joe Drape, Big East Is Bulking Up, But Not on Football Field, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2003, at
D6.
56
 BIG EAST CONFERENCE, BIG EAST CONFERENCE POLICY MANUAL 2005-06, at 1 (2005),
available at http://www.bigeast.org/ot/05_policy_manual. h tml.
" Complaint, supra note 14, at 5. The Big East is structured as a tax-exempt not-for-
profit corporation under Section 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Service Tax Code
(1986). Telephone Interview with John Marinatto, Senior Associate Commissioner, Big
East Conference (Nov. 16, 2004).
55 See Complaint, supra note 14, at 5.
59 See Press Release, Univ. of Miami Athletics, ACC to Enter Formal Discussions with
U.M. for Potential Membership (May 16, 2003), available at littp://hurricanesports.col-
legesports.com/genre1/051603aaa.htm
 I.
6° ACC: Miami, Virginia Tech Ready to Accept, ESPN.coM , June 25, 2003, http://espn.go.
cumincaa/news/2003/0625/1572842.1anni.
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27, and Miami accepted on June 30.61
 Boston College and Syracuse
were not offered ACC membership at that time. 62
After the two additions, the ACC had eleven members, which was
one short of the twelve required by the NCAA to hold a conference
championship game.° Several months later, in the fall of 2003, the
NCAA Championship Cabinet and Football Issues Committee de-
cided not to recommend that the NCAA allow conferences with fewer
than twelve teams to have a championship game." Soon afterward, on
October 12, the ACC offered, and Boston College accepted, a formal
invitation to become the twelfth member of the ACC." Each of the
three migrating schools paid a $1 million withdrawal fee to the Big
East upon its departure. 66
Boston College's proffered reasons for switching conferences in-
chided more than the potential financial gain.° Although some mem-
bers of the remaining Big East schools asserted that Boston College was
part of a conspiracy to weaken and destroy the Big East as a competitor
for broadcast revenue and other rights,68
 Boston College stated several
reasons similar to those advanced by other schools that have decided to
switch conferences.69
 University officials noted that the ACC is com-
prised of schools that are similar to Boston College academically, as the
ACC has a number of universities that, like Boston College, are ranked
in the top forty national universities." Other important considerations,
61 Mike Corey, Update: Miami, Va. Tech. Accept Invitations from ACC, CHRON. ONLINE (Duke
Univ.), June 26, 2003, available at http://wwwdukechronicle.com/media/paper884/news/
2003/06/26/News/Update.MiamiNa.TechAccept.Invitations.FromAcc-1463907.shunl?.
62
 ACC: Miami, Virginia Tech Ready to Accept, supra ndte GO.
63
 See Boston College Could Become League's 12th Team, ESPN.com, Oct. 11, 2003, hop://
espn.go.com/neaa/news/2003/1011/1635604.html.
64 Id.
65 Vega, supra note 11, at Fl.
66 Vega, supra note 11, at Fl; Conferences Schedule Games, supra note 11. Although Miami
and Virginia Tech paid $1 million withdrawal fees as dictated by the Big East constitution,
Boston College only paid the $1 million fee by settlement after a court battle over the fee
amount. Univ. of Conn. v. Univ. of Miami, No. TTD-CV-03-0081757-S (Conn. Sup. Ct. filed
June 6, 2003); Big East, ACC Settle Dispute on Realignment, WASH. Pos-r, May 4, 2005, at D02
[hereinafter 131g East, ACC Settle]; Vega, supra note I I, at Fl; Conferences Schedule Games, su-
pra note 11; see infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
67
 See Q&A: Ft: Leahy Discusses BC's Move to the ACC, BOSTON COLL. CHRON., Oct. 17,
2003 [hereinafter Q&A: Ft Leahy], available at http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/rvp/pubaf/
chronicle/v12/o17/qa.html. For a brief discussion of the financial prospects of members
of the newly enlarged ACC, see infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text_
68 ACC Has 12 to Stage Football Title Game, ESPN.coM , Oct. 12, 2003, http://espn.go.
cow/ ncaa/news/2003/1012/1636467.1um 1.
69 See Q&A: Ft Leahy, supra note 67.
" Id.
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according to Boston College officials, were the expansion of the poten-
tial student recruitment base and the ACC's commitment to a program
of academic cooperation and collaboration. 71
 In addition to academic
concerns, the stability and long-term viability of the new ACC was an
attractive feature.72
 Finally, the financial gain from joining the ACC was
expected to benefit Boston College in numerous ways, including sup-
port for non-revenue sports."
B. Ramifications of Recent Departures from the Big East Conference
The migration of Miami, Boston College, and Virginia Tech from
the Big East to the ACC sent shock waves across many universities
throughout the country. 74
 The Big East responded by replacing the
departing schools with three teams that were previously members of
Conference USA: the University of Louisville, the University of Cin-
cinnati, and the University of South Florida." Conference USA lost
several other member schools as well; Texas Christian University
moved to the Mountain West Conference, and both the University of
North Carolina-Charlotte and Saint Louis University moved to the
Atlantic 10 Conference. 76
 To compensate for these losses, Conference
USA added Rice University, Southern Methodist University, the Uni-
versity of Texas at El Paso, and the University of Tulsa from the West-
ern Athletic Conference (the "WAC") and the University of Central
Florida and Marshall University from the Mid-American Conference."
The WAC offset its losses by adding the University of Idaho, Utah
State University, and New Mexico State University from the Sun Belt
Id,
72 Id.
73 Id. Non-revenue sports are Olympic sports such as wrestling, track and field, swimming,
and volleyball, which do not generate much money for their respective colleges. Myles Brand,
Nan-Revenue? Olympic Spoils are Priceless at Colleges, SAN DIEGO Usnotg-Tluu., Aug. 15, 2004, avail-
able at http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20040815/
 news 1s15guest.html.
74 See Brand, supra note 73.
75
 Drape, supra note 55, at Dl. The Big East also added Marquette University and
DePaul University in every sport but football, as neither university currently fields a foot-
ball team. Id.
75 See Official Site of Conference USA, supra note 42.
77 See id.
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Conference." Thus, the migration out of the Big East triggered a
domino effect of conference realignment across the country."
The financial implications of these conference realignments were
staggering." For example, expansion to twelve teams from nine gave
the ACC the ability to procure a more lucrative television football
contract, create an ACC Championship Game, and increase ticket
sales.81 The ACC expected these new opportunities to generate an
additional $30 to $35 million in annual revenue. 82
Conversely, the Big East faced adverse financial effects." As a re-
sult of a reconfiguration clause in its television contracts with ABC
and ESPN, the Big East was forced to renegotiate the terms of those
deals. 84
 Because three of the preeminent football schools in the Big
East left for the ACC, the Big East was forced to accept less money for
rights to broadcast its football games. 85 As a result, annual television
payments to the Big East dropped from $15 million to $10 million."
The financial impact of the conference realignments extended to
the profit opportunities presented by the Bowl Championship Series
(the "BCS").87 Before the late 1990s, college football determined its
national champion through a series of games, called bowl games."
Representatives from each bowl game would invite two successful
teams to play a game, and after all of the bowl games were played,
78 See Official Web Site of The Western Athletic Conference, About the WAC: History
of the WAC, http://www.w -ac.org/view_section.asp?section=Ahout%20the%20WAC (last
visited Feb. 9, 2006).
15 See William C. Rhoden, Switching Conferences for Prestige and Profit, N.Y. TimE.s, Nov. 5,
2003, at 06.
80 See Horrow, supra note 2.
81 See id.
82
 See id.
83 See id.
84 Drape, supra note 55, at D6.
85 See id. ESPN.com writer Ivan Maisel commented, 'Take Ohio State and Michigan out
of the Big Ten, or USC and Washington out of the Pac-I 0, and you have life as the Big East
is about to know it." Ivan Maisel, What About Football?, ESPN.com , June 25, 2003, http://
espn.go.com/ncaa/news/2003/0625/1572842.html.
88 1-lorrow, supra note 2.
87 See Bowl Championship Series 2004-05 Media Guide at 6-7 (2004) [hereinafter BCS
Media Guide] (on file with author); Press Release, Executive Office of Governor John G.
Rowland, State of Conn., Connecticut, Other Big East Schools Sue Miami, BC, ACC Over
Move to ACC ( June 6, 2003), available at http://www.ct.gov/governorrowland/cwp/
view.asp?A=I336&Q=257274. The BCS Media Guide is updated annually and is available at
http://www.bcs.footballorg/mediaguide.pdf  (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
88 See jodi M. Warmbrod, Comment, Antitrust in Amateur Athletics: Fourth and Long: Why
Non•BCS Universities Should Punt Rather Than Go for an Antitrust Challenge to the Bowl Champi-
onship Series, 57 OKLA. L. RE.v. 333,336-45 (2004).
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members of the national sports media would vote to determine which
team deserved to be crowned national champion. 89 Several national
media polls were used in the voting and on numerous occasions, the
polls selected different teams as the national champion. 99
Dissension over this ranking system grew among college football
participants and followers, so the major bowl game organizers
modified the system to increase the likelihood of yielding a single na-
tional champion.91
 In 1998, the Orange, Sugar, Rose, and Fiesta Bowls •
joined with the ACC, Big East, Big 12, Big Ten, Pacific-10, SEC, and
the University of Notre Dame to establish the BCS, a system by which
the Division I football national champion could be determined while
maintaining the traditional howl system. 92
 Eight teams play in BCS
bowl games each year; six berths are guaranteed to the respective
champions of the aforementioned BCS conferences." The other two
at-large berths can be obtained by any Division I team, regardless of
conference affiliation.94
The guaranteed spot in a BCS game is extremely lucrative for the
conferences." For example, each conference with teams in the 2005
Rose Bowl received payments of $14.5 million." On the other hand,
participation in non-BCS games does not generate nearly the same
amount of money for the conferences. 97
 For example, whereas BCS
participants in the 2002-03 season were paid between $13.5 and $16.5
million for a bowl game, payouts to non-BCS bowl participants rarely
exceeded $1 million. 98
99 See id. at 338-40.
99 See id. at 33849. Between 1990 and 1997, for instance, the national polls selected
"dual" national champions three times-1990, 1991, and 1997. Id. at 338-39 & n.30.
91 See id. at 338-49.
92 BCS Media Guide, supra note 87, at 2.
93 Id. at 3. The five non-BCS Division I conferences are Conference USA, the Mid-
American Conference, the Mountain West Conference, the Sun Belt Conference, and the
Western Athletic Conference. See id.
94 Id. at 4. Ad at-large bid is one which is not guaranteed to the champion of one of
the BCS Conferences. See id. at 3-4.
95 See id. at 6.
" Tournament of Roses, Rose Bowl Game FAQs, http://www.tournamentofroses.com/
rosebowlgame/gametaqs.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2006). The revenue generated from the
participation of one conference member in the Rose Bowl is distributed for the benefit of
all member universities of the respective conferences. Id.
97 See Press Release, Executive Office of Governor John G. Rowland, State of Conn.,
supra note 87.
99 Id.
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The BCS agreement, however, provides for review and possible re-
moval of the six conferences with guaranteed berths in BCS games. 99 If
the champion of one of these conferences does not average a BCS rank-
ing between one and twelve over a four-year period, that conference
may lose its guaranteed berth and the accompanying financial payout.m
The loss of perennial national football powers Miami and Virginia Tech
exposed the Big East to this risk. 101
 The BCS standings from the 2004
season validate this concern, as the Big East champion and representa-
tive in the BCS Tostitos Fiesta Bowl, the University of Pittsburgh ("Pitts-
burgh"), had a final BCS ranking of only twenty-one.m 2
Financial gains to colleges from participation in the BCS
significantly raise the stakes of conference membership and realign-
ment.'" The harmful impact that the defections had on the Big East is
demonstrated by the statistical weakness of its BCS representative in the
year after the conference realignment.'" The potential for losing its
guaranteed berth in the BCS is one of the likely factors which spurred
remaining Big East members to seek legal remedies from defecting
schools.w5
III. LAWSUITS STEMMING FROM THE BIG EAST DEPARTURES
The significant financial effects of conference realignment give
schools the incentive to fight against migration, including by seeking
damages through litigation.m As it became clear that several schools,
including Miami and Boston College, would leave the Big East for the
ACC, several remaining Big East schools jointly sued the departing
99
 See BCS Media Guide, supra note 87, at 3.
100 See id. If the Big East loses its guaranteed BCS berth, the number of schools in BCS-
guaranteed conferences would drop below fifty percent of the total number of Division I
schools. See Steve Wieberg, The Runaway Train, USA Toone, Nov. 4,2003, at 1C, available at
hup://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/foutbal1/2003-11-04-state_x.hun
 (online version
titled Opinions Differ on How to Implement Changes). This shift would provide further ammu-
nition for those who argue that the BCS violates antitrust laws. See id. For a comprehensive
discussion of antitrust aspects of the BCS, see generally Warmbrod, rufnia note 88.
101 See Wendell Barnhouse, Big East Losing its BCS Clout, FORT WORTH STAR-THLEGRAM,
Sept. 27,2004, at 170.
102
 Press Release, Nat'l Football Found. and Coll. Hall of Fame, Inc., 2004 Final Bowl
Championship Series Standings (Dec. 5, 2004), http://www.bcsfootball.org/files/bcs-short-8.pdf.
log
	 supra notes 80-102 and accompanying text.
104
 See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
195
 See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
106 See'supro notes 80-102 and accompanying text.
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schools. 1 °7 This Part examines this suit, frames the claim of breach of
fiduciary duty, and discusses related litigation regarding the withdrawal
fee. 100
A. An Overview of the Lawsuits
On June 6, 2003, the University of Connecticut ("UConn"), Pitts-
burgh, Rutgers, Virginia Tech, and West Virginia University ("West Vir-
ginia") sued'the ACC, Miami, and Boston College in Connecticut Su-
perior Court (the "UConn lawsuit"). 1 °° Virginia Tech soon dropped out
of the lawsuit when it opted to join the ACC."° The lawsuit pursued
several causes of action against the parties.'" Against Miami and Boston
College, the "defecting schools," the plaintiffs brought claims of breach
of fiduciary duty, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, promissory estoppel, and equitable estoppel. 112
 Against the
ACC, the plaintiffs asserted claims of inducing a breach of fiduciary
duty; aiding and abetting that breach and seizure of a venture oppor-
tunity; and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing. 113
 The plaintiffs also filed claims of unjust enrichment and civil
conspiracy against all the defendants, and plaintiff UConn filed a claim
of unfair competition against all the defendants under Connecticut's
Unfair Trade Practices Act." 4
On October 10, 2003, Connecticut Superior Court Judge Sferrazza
dismissed the ACC from the UConn lawsuit, citing lack of personal ju-
risdiction."° Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, a
107
 Press Release, Executive Office of Governor John G. Rowland, State of Conn., supra
note 87.
108 See infra notes 109-34 and accompanying text.
109 See generally Complaint, supra note 14.
"0
 Press Release, Office of the Attorney Gen. of Va., Kilgore flails Dismissal of Lawsuit
Against Atlantic Coast Conference (Feb. 25, 2004), http://www.oag.state.va.us/niedia%2Ocen-
ter/Curren
 t%20AG%20News%20Releases/022504_Kilgore_Flails_Dismissal_of ACC_Laws
uit.htm.
III Complaint, supra note 14, at 25-35.
112 Id, at 25-29. Boston College was dropped from the initial lawsuit on June 26,2003
after the ACC declined to offer Boston College membership in the ACC. See ACC: Miami,
Virginia Tech Ready to Accept, supra note 60.
"I Complaint, supra note 14, at 29-31.
114 Id. at 31-35.
"5 Univ. of Conn. v. Univ. of Miami, No. X07CV030081757S, 2003 WL 22390940, at *4
(Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 10, 2003). The ACC, an unincorporated association of universities,
had its offices and officers located in North Carolina. Id. at *1. No member university of
the ACC or officer of the ACC was located in Connecticut; thus, personal jurisdiction
would have existed only if the ACC had been doing business or operating within the state.
Id. at *3. The court ruled that the minimal contacts between the ACC and Connecticut,
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strong advocate for his state school and a lead attorney in the case,
quickly re-filed the lawsuit, adding as defendants the directors of the
ACC in their representative capacities, the Commissioner of the ACC in
his individual capacity, and Boston College's Athletic Director." 6 On
February 23, 2004, the court granted motions to dismiss the claims
against the ACC directors and against the ACC Commissioner."?
As a result of the negative publicity generated by the conference
transfers, on October 20, 2003, Miami filed a lawsuit (the "Miami law-
suit") against the Big East Conference, UConn, Pittsburgh, Rutgers,
and West Virginia in the Miami-Dade County Circuit Court." 8
 This
lawsuit alleged breach of contract and a conspiracy to defraud." 9
 Ad-
ditionally, Miami sued UConn for defamation.' 2°
On April 27, 2005, the parties settled the UConn lawsuit for ap-
proximately $5 million. 121
 Settlement terms provided that each of the
four Big East schools in the lawsuit would receive $1 million, nine
football games would be played between Big East and ACC teams, and
Miami and Boston College each would receive smaller payments from
the Big East as "returns of capital." 122
 Ostensibly as part of the settle-
ment, the Miami lawsuit was dismissed in early May 2005 upon the
stipulation of the parties. 123
resulting from out-of-conference athletic conferences, and payments from a corporation
located in Connecticut, were not sufficient to constitute "doing business" under the long-
arm statute. Id. at *4.
116
 Matt Apuzzo, fudge Again Dismisses Big East Lawsuit vs. ACC, CSTV FOOTBALL NATION,
Feb. 9, 2004, hup://www.collegesports.com/sports/m-footblistories/020904aaj.html.
117
 Univ. of Conn. v. Ad. Coast Conference, No. X07CV030082695S, 2004 WL 424221,
at *4, *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 2004). The court agreed with the defendants that a suit
against the officers or agents of the ACC ought to be regarded as a suit against the ACC
itself. Id. at *3. Because the court previously ruled that it did not have personal jurisdiction
over the ACC, the court also dismissed the claims against these defendants. Id. at *3, *4.
118 See Press Release, Univ. of Miami Athletics, University of Miami Files Suit Against BIG
EAST Conference and 4 Member Institutions (Oct. 20, 2003), http://hurricanesports.college
sports.com/sports/m-footbl/spec-re1/102003atta.html.
116 Id.
Id.
' 21
 Univ. of Conn. v. Univ. of Miami, No. TTD-CV-03-00817575 (Conn. Sup. Ct. filed
June 6, 2003); Big East, ACC Settle, supra note 66, at 002. This amount included the $1 mil-
lion exit fee that Boston College was scheduled to pay upon leaving the Big East at the end
of June 2005. Conferences Schedule Games, supra note 11.
Ray Fittipaldo, Settlement Benefits Pitt, WVU• Attractive Games, Money Fallout from ACC
Suit, PITTSBURGEI POST-GAZETTE, May 5, 2005, at DI.
123
 Univ. of Miami v. Big East Conference, No. 2003-24488-CA-01 (Fla. Miami-Dade
County Ct. filed May 18, 2005).
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B. Alleged Breach of Fiduciary Duty
The UConn lawsuit plaintiffs alleged that the defecting schools
breached their fiduciary duties by, among other things, making express
and implied statements that reassured other Big East members that
they remained committed to the conference. 124
 Although the plaintiffs
named both Miami and Boston College as defendants, the claim fo-
cused primarily on Miami. 126
Some of the allegations concerned rumored discussions between
the ACC and Miami in 1999. 126 At that time, Miami officials, including
its athletic director and its president, made statements regarding Mi-
ami's commitment to the Big East and its lack of plans to change con-
ferences. 127 The UConn lawsuit plaintiffs alleged that several years later,
in a 2002 conference meeting, Miami repeated its commitment to re-
main in the Big East. 128 The plaintiffs also alleged that Miami gave the
Big East and its member schools implied assurances of remaining in the
Big East by signing agreements in 2000 and early 2003 concerning
rights to broadcast Big East games. 129
C. The Withdrawal Fee
Another chapter of the story unfolded when Boston College and
the Big East disagreed about the exit fee that would be charged to Bos-
ton College for leaving the Big East.'" Originally, the constitution of
the Big East Conference imposed a $1 million exit fee for leaving the
Big East as long as notice was given at least one year in advance of July
1, the beginning of the conference year. 131
 On October 6, 2003, the Big
East member schools, with Boston College and Notre Dame abstaining,
amended the constitution to increase the exit fee to $5 million for any
member university that leaves the conference. 132 Boston College, after
accepting its invitation to join the ACC on October 12, challenged this
124 Complaint, supra note 14, at 13-17, 25-26.
125 See id. at 13-17, 25-26.
126 See id. at 13-16.
127
 See id.
128 Id. at 16.
129 Complaint, supra note 14, at 17.
13° Kevin Armstrong, BC to Pay $1 Million Fee to Leave Big East, HEIGHTS (Boston Col-
lege), Sept. 7, 2004, at B3, available at http://www.bcheights.corn/news/2004/09/07
 (click
on article title under ''Sports").
131
 Trs. of Boston Coll. v. Big East Conference, 18 Mass. L. Rptr. 177, 178 (Super. Ct.
2004).
132 Id.
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amendment in court (the "Boston College lawsuit") by claiming that it
was not adopted in accordance with the terms of the Big East constitu-
tion.'" The court ruled in favor of Boston College, finding that the
provision governing the amendment process in the Big East constitu-
tion had not been followed, and thus the court declared the purported
amendment invalid. 154
IV. FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN THE CORPORATE SETTING
One claim in the UConn lawsuit was that the defecting schools,
Miami and Boston College, breached the fiduciary duties that the
schools owed to the Big East and its fellow member schools.'" Before
analyzing the facts and issues relevant to the case, it is helpful to have
an understanding of the fiduciary duties involved.' 36 Parts IVA and
fV.B discuss fiduciary duties on a conceptual level, while Part IV.0 ar-
ticulates specific duties owed in the context of nonprofit corporations
such as the Big East.'" Part IV.D explains that university representa-
tives to conference boards have additional duties to their schools that
are derived from the university-student relationship, and Part IV.E
establishes a framework for understanding how the above-referenced
duties can come into conflict.'"
A. Classic Articulation of Fiduciary Duties
The 1928 New York Court of Appeals case Meinhard v. Salmon
provides a classic statement of fiduciary duties.' 59
 In Meinhard, the
court concluded that the lessor/manager of a commercial building
had a fiduciary duty to notify his leasing partner about related busi-
ness opportunities. 140
 Meinhard is the seminal case involving fiduciary
duties, as it contains oft-quoted language from Chief Judge Cardozo
articulating the classic understanding of fiduciary duties among those
entering into business ventures together:
133 Id. at 177.
,34 Id. at 182. The court also noted that, although the issue was not before it, the at-
tempt to increase the withdrawal fee from $1 million to $5 million may have been void and
legally unenforceable if it were found to be insufficiently related to the specific harm in-
volved—that resulting from teams leaving the conference. Id. at 177.
13 Complaint, supra note 14, at 25-27.
136 See infra notes 139-216 and accompanying text.
137 See infra notes 139-72 and accompanying text.
138 See infra notes 173-228 and accompanying text.
I" See 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
"0 Id.
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Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while
the enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many
forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those
acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone but the punc-
tilio of honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of be-
havior."'
ChiefJudge Cardozo proposed that, under certain circumstances, one
might owe more than just the duty owed by those dealing at arms'
length in market transactions. 142 His articulation of fiduciary duty has
been relied upon by hundreds of courts across the country. 143
B. An Alternative View on Fiduciary Duties
Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel have sug-
gested a view of fiduciary duties that varies from Cardozo's traditional
conception. 144
 They propose that fiduciary principles can be viewed as
replacing specific penalties for actions taken in divergence with the
original positions of the parties. 145
 In many situations, contracting par-
ties can have difficulty creating contractual language that covers all
contingencies. 146 Because of these difficulties in anticipating when
and how the interests of the parties might diverge, fiduciary duties act
as a sort of standard-form penalty clause triggered when one party
acts contrary to the interests of the other.' 47
 These fiduciary duties
approximate what the contracting parties likely would have agreed
upon had they been able to anticipate the specific events. 148 Concep-
tually, this is the functional equivalent of contractual good faith; when
money damages are at stake, the concept operates somewhat like a
liquidated damages provision. 149
 Thus, fiduciary duties can be viewed
141 See id.
142 See id.
148 See Mary Siegel, Fiduciary Duty Myths in Close Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377,
442 n.340 (2004).
14' See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE
L.J. 698, 702 (1982).
145
 Pross v. Katz, 784 F.2d 455, 458 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting Easterbrook & Fische!, supra
note 144, at 702).
146 See id.
147
 Id. (quoting Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 144, at 702).
148 Id.
149 JAMES J .
 FISHMAN & STEVEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 153 (2d ed.
2000); see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 144, at 702.
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as a default rule, reducing transaction and enforcement costs and act-
ing as an alternative to direct monitoring of individuals such as direc-
tors and officers.' 5°
For example, it would likely be difficult to approximate in ad-
vance the damages that would result from a corporate director's di-
vulgence of a trade secret to a competitor.' 5' To include a specific
damages provision in the director's contract would require knowledge
of numerous future events or situations that would be impossible to
know at the time of contract formation, such as the future develop-
ment of trade secrets and their market values. 152
 It also would be im-
practical to amend all employment agreements involved whenever a
new situation arises which could lead to potential future damages if
the director or officer acts improperly. 153
 In such situations, a loose
concept of fiduciary duties is a more feasible alternative to an imprac-
tical contractual provision. 154
C. Fiduciary Duties of Directors and Officers of Nonprofit Corporations
The concept of fiduciary duties in general has been refined in the
setting of nonprofit corporations. 155
 The Big East is a nonprofit corpo-
ration governed by a board of directors whose fiduciary responsibilities
are primarily influenced by the standards of corporate law. 156
 Each Big
East member university has representatives who sit on the board of di-
rectors and are subject to the fiduciary duties discussed in this sec-
tion. 157
 The standards and duties owed to the nonprofit corporation by
directors are grounded in both the common law and state and federal
statutes. 158
 The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, which has
been adopted by many states, explains this duty of care as follows:
15° FISHMAN Sc SCHWARZ, supra note 149, at 153; see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note
144, at 702.
151 See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
152 See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
i" See supra notes 14-4-50 and accompanying text.
155
 See infra notes 156-72 and accompanying text.
156 See Complaint, supra note 14, at 5; James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountabil-
ity, 62 Mo. L. Rev. 218,225 (2003).
157
 See Complaint, sutra note 14, at 5.
156
 MELINDA A AGSTEN, GOVERNANCE AND NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS: REQUIREMENTS
AND EXPECTATIONS IN A POST- SARIiANES-OXLEY WORLD: A PRIMER FOR DIRECTORS AND
MANAGEMENT OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 3 (2004), available al http://www.wiggin.com/
c1b30/cgi-bin/pubs/Governance%20and%20Nonprofit%20
Corporations. pdf.
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A director shall discharge his or her duties as a director:.
(1) in good faith; (2) with the care an ordinarily prudent
person in a like position would exercise under similar cir-
cumstances; and (3) in a manner the director reasonably be-
lieves to be in the best interests of the corporation.' 59
Caselaw from courts across the country confirms that fiduciary rela-
tionships and other obligations of corporate directors apply to chari-
table or nonprofit corporations.'"
The fiduciary duty owed by directors and officers of nonprofit
corporations is commonly divided into two basic duties: the duty of
loyalty and the duty of care. 161
 The duty of care, which is less applica-
ble in the Big East dispute, requires acting as an ordinarily prudent
person would under similar circumstances. 162 This duty is primarily
concerned with the director's competence in performing his or her
functions and obligations as a director.'" The duty of loyalty is to act
faithfully and in the best interests of the corporation.'" For a nonprofit
corporation specifically, the duty entails pursuing the charitable pur-
pose for which the corporation exists.'" To satisfy the duty, directors
must pursue the interests of the corporation, not their own interests or
those of another organization.'"
These fiduciary duties are generally owed to the corporation.' 67
If, however, the director causes harm to a corporation member as a
result of the breach of the fiduciary duty, then the harmed member
may bring claims for breach against the director. 168
 For instance, the
plaintiffs in the UConn lawsuit claimed that the defecting schools
caused harm to the remaining Big East schools through breach of this
duty of loyalty when they left for the ACC.'"
'59
 REVISED MODE.I, NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1987).
160
 See, e.g., Triple-A Baseball Club Assocs. v. Ne. Baseball, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 513, 545
(D. Me. 1987); Summers v. Cherokee Children & Family Servs., Inc., 112 S.W.3d 486, 503
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).
161 Summers, 112 S.W.3d at 503.
162 See id.
163
 Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Para-
doxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. Com.. L. 631, 641 (1998).
164 Summers, 112 S.W.3d at 504.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167
 Enchanted Valley RV Resort, Ltd. v. Weese, 526 S.E.2c1 124, 131 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
168 Id.
169 See Complaint, supra note 14, at 3.
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The standards of fiduciary duties for directors of nonprofit cor-
porations also call for close scrutiny of those directors who engage in
conflict-of-interest transactions) 7° The Revised Model Nonprofit Cor-
poration Act defines a conflict-of-interest transaction as "a transaction
with the corporation in which a director of the corporation has a di-
rect or indirect interest." 171 A director of a corporation "has an indi-
rect interest in the transaction if ... another entity of which the direc-
tor is a director, officer, or trustee is a party to the transaction." 172
D. Conference Board Members' Duties to Their Own Universities
While representative members of conference boards owe duties
to the conference as members of a nonprofit corporation, they also
owe duties to their own universities) 73 An officer of a not-for-profit
corporation such as a private university or college must "discharge his
or her duties in good faith and with the care that an ordinarily pru-
dent person in a like position would exercise under similar circum-
stances and in a manner that the officer believes to be in the best in-
terests of the corporation."174
A background perspective into the varying theories of the rela-
tionship between universities and their students can illuminate the
types of duties owed by universities to their students as well as demon-
strate the potential for a conflict of duties for university officers who
also sit on athletic conference boards) 75 Courts once considered the
university as standing in loco parentis with respect to the student) 76
Under this view, the university's relationship with the student was one
of nearly complete control)" As long as the university did not exer-
cise its authority in an arbitrary or capricious manner, it satisfied its
obligations to the student) 78 Over time, however, this doctrine has
dissipated, and judicial protection of student rights has received more
favor, in part because of recognition that the modern student makes a
17° Summers, 112 S.W.3d at 504.
171 REv ism-) MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.31(a) (1987).
172 Id. § 8.31(d).
1" See MARGARET E. PHELAN, NONPROFIT ENTERPRISES: CORPORATIONS, TRUSTS, AND
ASSOCIATIONS § 5:02 (2000) (citing REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. Acr § 8.42 (1987)).
174 Id,
175 See infra notes 176-216 and accompanying text.
176 See, e.g., Gott v. Berea Coll., 161 S.W. 204, 206-07 (Ky. 1913); see also Robert P.
Faulkner, Note, Judicial Deference to University Decisions Not to Grant Degrees, Certificates, and
Credit—The Fiduciary Alternative, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 837, 839-40 (1989).
177 See Faulkner, supra note 176, at 840.
1" Id. at 841-42.
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significant investment of time and money in his or her education with
the expectation of a substantial return. 179
More often, the relationship between the university and student
has been cast in terms of contract law. 18° Educational institutions of-
ten have express contractual relationships with students associated
with providing housing, food, and loans.' 8 ' In addition, implicit con-
tractual relationships between universities and students have been
recognized in a variety of contexts. 182 Contract theory has been used
for both academic and disciplinary disputes)"
Theorists have advanced another important account of the rela-
tionship between universities and students that is based on fiduciary
principles. 184
 The theory, advanced by Professor Warren Seavey in
1957, starts with the proposition that a fiduciary is one whose function
it is to act for the benefit of another in matters relevant to the parties'
relationship. 185
 Because schools exist primarily for the education of
their students, it follows that professors and administrators act as
fiduciaries of the students.' 86 This notion has received some support
from legal scholars over the years. 187
Furthermore, Professor Alvin Goldman has noted that the student-
university relationship consists of all of the elements that are usually
found in a fiduciary relationship.' 88
 He also noted that "the university's
duty to its students may, from time to time, conflict with a duty it owes
178 Id. at 844-45.
180 See id. at 850-51.
181 KAPLAN & LEE, supra note 38, at 373.
182
 Id. at 373-76; see Steinberg v. Chi. Med. Sch., 354 N.E.2d 586, 591 OIL App. Ct.
1976), affd in part and nevi 'd in part, 371 N.E.2d 634, 640 (III. 1977) (asserting that a medi-
cal school, upon receiving an application fee and an application for admission, had an
implied contract with the applicant to judge his qualifications solely according to the
school's published admission standards); Eden v. Bd. of Trs., 374 N.Y.S.2d 686, 691 (App.
Div. 1975) (acceptance of an application for admission creates a vested contractual right
for the student to receive instruction from the university); Healy v. Larsson, 323 N.Y,S.2d
625, 626 (Sup. Ct. 1971), affil, 348 N.Y.S.al 971 (App. Div. 1973), affd, 318 N.E.2d 608,
608 (N.Y. 1974) (admission to a university creates an implied contract between student
and university that the student will be granted a degree if he or she completes the pre-
scribed requirements).
IRS KAPLIN LEY., supra note 38, at 373.
184
 See Faulkner, supra note 176, at 855-59.
to Warren A. Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 Elmtv. L. REV. 1406, 1407
n.3 (1957).
186 See id.
187 See Faulkner, supra note 176, at 855-59.
IB8
 Alvin L. Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Its Students—A Fiduciary Theory, 54
Ky. L.J. 643, 671 (1966).
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to some other group." 199
 In the context of disciplinary sanctions im-
posed by the university, for example, he asserted that these conflicts
must be settled on a case-by-case basis by taking into account any spe-
cial circumstances involved.'" Although Professor Goldman's analysis
focused on a potential conflict between duties such as the duty to pro-
tect the integrity of the educational process and the duty to act for the
benefit of the community, the potential for conflicting fiduciary duties
also seems likely in the current context of athletic conference migra-
tion. 191
Another twist on the scholarly debate regarding fiduciary duties
owed by university officials is the proposal that universities owe
fiduciary duties as trustees. 192
 This perspective dictates that the univer-
sity is a trustee for the students, faculty, donors, and alumni.'" The uni-
versity, as a trustee, owes fiduciary duties of selflessness, care, fairness,
and disclosure in all its dealings with students, including in the admini-
stration of its admissions policy and in the management and allocation
of its assets)"
At least one commentator has used the fiduciary model of the
university-student relationship in a discussion of administrative error
in universities)" Under this approach, the elements of the fiduciary
relationship arc present in the university-student relationship because
students confer upon the university a considerable amount of power
and control over their money, futures, and persons. 196 This power is
retained by the university and used to further the best interests of the
student. 197
 The student places great confidence in the university to act
in his or her best interests; this type of confidence, offered by one giv-
ing up power to another to use it in the person's benefit, gives rise to
a fiduciary relationship.'" Thus, when making decisions implicating
the relationship between the university and the student, the university,
as fiduciary, must have the best interests of the student beneficiary at
heart.'"
189 See id. at 675.
199 Id.
191 See id.
192 See Paul G. Haskell, The University as Trustee, 17 GA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1982).
195 Id.
194
195
 Faulkner, supra note 176, at 855-65.
196
 Id. at 856.
197 Id.
198
	 id. at 856-57.
199
 Id. • at 859.
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Although courts most often view the university-student relation-
ship as contractual in nature, courts have begun, in recent years, to
find more legitimacy in some fiduciary duty claims against universities
and colleges.200
 Courts have not hesitated to find fiduciary relation-
ships between universities and students in sexual harassment claims."'
Moreover, courts have begun to recognize the potential for fiduciary
relationships between universities and students in the context of re-
search relationships.202
 In addition, a court in 2000 found that a uni-
versity had a fiduciary relationship with a disabled student who was
participating in an overseas program. 208
 Finally, a court in 2005 de-
termined that a university dean and a dormitory housemaster had a
special relationship with and thus a duty to exercise reasonable care
regarding a troubled student who committed suicide. 204
In the context of university financial investment, universities have
a fiduciary duty to use student tuition funds and other fees for the
uses for which they were intended. 205
 For example, one court found
that the dean of a university breached a fiduciary duty by using stu-
dent insurance premiums to help pay personnel who assisted him in
the administration of a student health insurance program. 2" In addi-
tion, trustees and officers of a university may be held liable for
breaching their fiduciary duties by involving the university in specula-
tive commercial activities. 207
 Students of a charitable institution, like a
university, are considered to be beneficiaries of a charitable trust,
triggering certain rights, like the right to sue in order to enforce the
trust or to prevent the improper use of the funds." 8 The Uniform
206
 Kent Weeks & Rich Haglund, Fiduciary Duties of College and University Faculty and Ad-
ministrators, 29 J.C. & U.L. 153, 158 (2002); see Johnson v. Schmitz, 119 F. Stipp. 2d 90, 98
(D. Conn. 2000); Bird v. Lewis & Clark Coll., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1277 (D. Or. 2000);
Schneider v. Plymouth State Coll., 744 A.2d 101, 105-06 (N.H. 1999).
201 Weeks & Haglund, supra note 200, at 159; see Schneider, 744 A.2d at 105-06 (holding
that the university-student relationship, built on a professional relationship of trust and
deference, gave rise to Fiduciary duties).
202 Weeks & Haglund, supra note 200, at 162; see Johnson, 119 F. Stipp. al at 98 (holding
that where a graduate student alleged the misappropriation of his scholarly theory, the
court recognized that Yale University may have owed a fiduciary duty to the graduate stu-
dent to safeguard him from faculty misconduct),
203 Bird, 104 E Stipp. 2d at 1277.
204
 Shin v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., No. 020403, 2005 WL 186910], at *11-13 (Mass. Super.
Ct. June 27, 2005).
2°5
 Weeks & Haglund, supra note 200, at 173.
206 See Bd. of Regents v. Martine, 607 S.W.2d 638, 642, 643 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
2°7
 Pat K Chew, Faculty-Generated Inventions: Who Owns the Golden Egg?, 1992 Wis. L.
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Management of Institutional Funds Act ("UMIFA") supports the view
that nonprofit corporate board directors have fiduciary duties regard-
ing the use of university funds. 209 UMIFA states:
In the administration of the powers to appropriate apprecia-
tion, to make and retain investments, and to delegate invest-
ment management of institutional funds, members of a gov-
erning board shall exercise ordinary business care and
prudence under the facts and circumstances prevailing at the
time of the action or decision. In so doing they shall consider
long and short term needs of the institution in carrying out its
educational, religious, charitable, or other eleemosynary pur-
poses, its present and anticipated financial requirements, ex-
pected total return on its investments, price level trends, and
general economic conditions." )
Under this model statute, universities have a fiduciary duty regarding
the proper use of university funds. 211
As has been explained above, a fiduciary relationship exists in the
context of the university-student relationship. 212 Thus, when conduct-
ing their university-related activities, school officials have a duty to do
what they believe to be best for their university and its students. 215 Al-
though usually this duty exists harmoniously with the other duties of
university officials, there are situations in , which there may be
conflicts.214 An example of such an occurrence is the situation involv-
ing the schools that left the Big East. 215 While the university represen-
tatives to the Big East had the duty to do what they thought was best
for their own schools—in this case to leave for the ACC—they also
had a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the conference.216
E. Conflicting Fiduciary Duties
As stated above, the university representatives to the Big East had
duties to their respective schools as well as to the Big East and its
209 See UNIF. MGMT. INST. FUNDS ACT § 6, 7A (Part II) U.L.A. 500 (1972); Douglas M.
Salaway, UMIFA and a Model for Endowment Investing, 22 J.C. & U.L. 1045,1065 (1996).
210 IND:. MGMT. INST. FUNDS ACT § 6, 7A (Part II) U.L.A. 500 (1972).
211 See supra notes 205-10 and accompanying text.
212 See supra notes 173-211 and accompanying text.
213 See supra notes 173-211 and accompanying text.
213 See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
216 See supra notes 59-73 and accompanying text.
216 See supra notes 155-211 and accompanying text.
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member schools.217 The existence of these two separate sets of
fiduciary duties belonging to university officials involved in a confer-
ence migration like that from the Big East to the ACC creates the po-
tential for conflicts of interest to arise. 218 This is because it is not al-
ways the case that a course of action benefiting an individual
conference member will also benefit the conference as a whole, and
university officials will have to decide on the most appropriate action
to take.213
Although no court has actually assessed the potential conflicts of
interest present in conference migrations, some guidance can come
from other forms of conflict-of-interest transactions. 22° In the general
setting of nonprofit corporations, a prime example of a conflict-of-
interest transaction occurs when a director or officer leaves a corpora-
tion to work for a conapetitor.221 Courts have dealt with a significant
amount of litigation regarding the potential breach of the duty of loy-
alty in such situations. 222
 Several general principles emerge from these
decisions.225 Directors or officers of corporations are not strictly for-
bidden from entering into a separate competing business. 224 But if
directors or officers do so, they must rebut claims of breach of
fiduciary duty by showing that they acted in good faith and did not act
in a way that caused injury to the first corporation. 225
Although the law has yet to provide clear guidance in situations
in which conflicts arise between a director's duties as a representative
of a member organization (such as a university) and his or her duties
as a director of a corporate board (such as the Big East), it appears
that disclosure to the board is a critical element of meeting the direc-
tor's obligations.226 This is because disclosure of conflicts of interest
gives the board notice of the potential conflict and allows the board
the opportunity to take steps to minimize any potential adverse ef-
fects. 227
 Had the Big East litigation proceeded, the court likely would
217 See supra notes 155-211 and accompanying text.
215 See supra notes 155-211 and accompanying text.
219 See supra notes 155-211 and accompanying text.
22° See infra notes 221-28 and accompanying text.
221 See, e.g., Vigoro Ind. v. Crisp, 82 F.3d 785,787-89 (8th Cir. 1996); Instrument Repair
Serv. v. Gunby, 518 S.E.2d 161,162-63 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
222 See, e.g., Vigoro, 82 F.3d at 787-89; Gunliy, 518 S.E.2d at 162-63.
223 See Anderson v. Heflin°, 658 N.W.2d 645,656-57 (Neb. 2003).
224 Id.
225 Id.
226
 SeeAGSTF.N, supra note 158, at 8.
227 See id.
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have examined the issue of disclosure regarding the migrating
schools' plans to leave the conference and to join a competing con-
ference. 225
V. CONFLICTING DUTIES OF A MEMBER OF Boni AN EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTION AND AN ATHLETIC CONFERENCE BOARD
In most cases, the duties of university representatives who simul-
taneously serve on conference boards do not conflict; thus, fiduciary
principles need not be invoked.229 Under normal circumstances, the
conferences serve to further the athletic, academic, and financial in-
terests of their member universities and the students who attend those
schools. 23° It follows that actions taken by conference board directors
and officers that are in the best interests of the conference are most
often also in the best interests of the member universities 2 3 '
Circumstances may arise, however, in which the best interests of
the member university diverge from the best interests of the confer-
ence. 232 Such a situation occurred with the Big East schools. 233 During
discussions with the ACC in 2003, university officials from Miami and
Boston College determined that it would be in the best interests of
their respective schools and their students to leave the Big East and
join the ACC.234 According to Boston College officials, this decision
was reached based upon a number of factors, including academic
similarity with ACC schools, academic cooperation opportunities, and
financial stability. 235
In cases involving such conflicting duties, disclosure is usually a
critical factor.236 Thus, a key question for a court regarding a claim of
breach of fiduciary duty in similar cases is to determine whether the
defecting schools were forthright, honest, and timely in their discus-
sions with their original conference and the other conference mem-
ber schools regarding their potential interest in moving to another
conference. 237 At some point, the interests of the defecting schools
223 See id.
229 See supra notes 155-211 and accompanying text.
230 See BigEast.org, supra note 35.
231 See id.
232 See supra notes 59-73 and accompanying text.
233 See supra notes 59-73 and accompanying text.
234 See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
235 Q&A: Fr. Leahy, supra note 67.
236
 See AcsrEtv , supra note 158, at 8.
237 See id.
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and the conference diverge, and from that point on, the defecting
schools have a duty to be open with the original conference and its
member institutions,m
In exploring a claim for breach of fiduciary duty in a conference
migration lawsuit, a court should take into account the history of con-
ference movement and the environment in which the transactions
took place.239 The history of movement among conferences shows
that it is not unusual for schools to change conferences. 24° It can be
inferred that school representatives periodically have informal discus-
sions with other conferences."' School representatives serving as both
university administrators and conference board members have duties
to both entities.242
 These duties, however, exist in a context in which
conference members should understand the situation between all of
the involved schools. 243
Member universities join conferences with the understanding
that they are looking out primarily for the good of their own
schools.244 Allegiance to a beneficial association with other schools
can be helpful to those other schools, but the primary purpose of that
association is to benefit one's own schoo1. 245 This is unlike a situation
where a director or officer of a corporate board is also surreptitiously
a member of a competing organization. 246 All parties involved in the
conferences understand the nature of their association, and all parties
have, or should have, an understanding of the history of conference
movement. 247
 In the Big East conflict, evidence of this common un-
derstanding appeared on the face of the document underlying the
conflict: a withdrawal fee was included in the Big East constitution. 248
Thus, unless the plaintiffs in such lawsuits can clearly show that the
defecting schools had secret agreements or significant negotiations
with the new conference to join and undermine the strength of the
old conference, thereby violating their fiduciary duties of disclosure
238 See id.
269 See supra notes 23-105 and accompanying text.
2" See Wieberg, supra note 7, at 8C.
241 See id.
242 See supra notes 155-211 accompanying text.
245 See supra notes 92-43, 50-58 and accompanying text.
244 See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
245 See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
246 See supra notes 220-25 and accompanying text.
247 See supra notes 42-43, 50-58 and accompanying text.
248 See Trs. of Boston Coll. v. Big East Conference, 18 Mass. L. Rptr. 177, 178 (Super. Ct.
2004).
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and loyalty, the free-market-style movement of schools between con-
ferences should be allowed to remain intact. 249
As members of a conference's board of directors, representatives
from the defecting schools have fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to
their conference.25° These administrators, however, also have duties to
their own schools. 251 These duties may arise from the implicit trust in-
ured to them to make decisions regarding the best interests—academic,
financial, or otherwise—for the university, similar to the duty to use
university financial resources appropriately. 252 They may also arise from
Professors Seavey and Goldman's conceptualization of the fiduciary
relationship between universities and their students. 253 But from what-
ever source the duty is derived, the administrators' first duty is to their
university. 254 By looking at administrators as representatives of their
universities first, and as members of the conference board of directors
second and simply as part of their duties to their universities, a broader
understanding of the issues can be achieved, and courts can diminish
their intrusions into the process of schools moving from one confer-
ence to another. 255
VI. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE WITHDRAWAL FEE
One piece of the Big East dispute, and the subject of one of the
lawsuits involved, was the $1 million withdrawal fee in the Big East
constitution, which was paid by Miami, Virginia Tech, and Boston Col-
lege.256 The withdrawal fee likely was included in the constitution be-
cause the member schools of the Big East realized that member
schools eventually might leave the conference, for whatever reason. 257
As such, the member schools apparently bargained with each other to
provide a sort of liquidated damages clause for leaving the Big East. 258
Regarding this type of withdrawal fee, damages for any potential
breach of fiduciary duty should be considered as subsumed into the
withdrawal penalty already assessed to each of the defecting
249 See supra notes 23-228 and accompanying text.
259 See supra notes 155-72 and accompanying text.
251 See supra notes 173-216 and accompanying text.
252 See supra notes 205-11 and accompanying text.
252 See Goldman, supra note 188, at 671; Seavey, supra note 185, at 1407 n.3.
254 See supra notes 173-216 and accompanying text.
255 See supra notes 23-216 and accompanying text.
256 See Trs. of Boston Coll., 18 Mass. L. Rptr. at 178.
257 See id. The Big East constitution is not a public document and was therefore un-
available for analysis.
259 See id.
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schools.259 According to Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel,
fiduciary principles can be viewed as taking the place of specific pen-
alties for actions taken in divergence with the original positions of the
parties.26° In this way, fiduciary duties act as a standard-form penalty
clause.261 They do so because of the difficulties of anticipating when
and how the interests of the parties might diverge. 262 In a Big-East-
type scenario, however, the existence of the withdrawal fee shows that
the parties likely did in fact bargain for specific damages in the case of
divergence from original intentions. 265 This scenario has already
played out with the intentions of the defecting schools, originally to
remain in association with the Big East, changing according to the
numerous articulated reasons, including academic and financial con-
cerns. 264 As the Big East dispute reveals, the withdrawal fee included
in a conference's constitution can be read as a specific bargained-for
contractual provision, meaning additional damages based on
fiduciary principles are unnecessary. 265
 Thus, if a previously bar-
gained-for withdrawal fee exists, damages the conference or the re-
maining member schools suffer as a result of school migration should
be considered as already remedied through payment of the fee. 266
This viewpoint is consistent with the basic concept of a withdrawal fee
and may reduce the likelihood that parties will resort to the court sys-
tem if similar conference migration issues arise in the future. 267
CONCLUSION
College football is big business. Revenues from television contracts
and other sources have added high stakes to major college football alli-
ances. The history of collegiate athletic conferences demonstrates a
tradition of creation, change, movement, and fluidity. The lawsuits be-
tween Big East member schools and the defecting schools serve as an
example of how concerns about the stability of revenue flow can result
in quick resort to the legal system. In any future lawsuits of this type,
allegations of breach of fiduciary duties should be approached with the
266 See supra notes 144-54 and accompanying text.
266 See Easterbrook & Fische), supra note 144, at 702.
261
 See id.
252
2" See supra notes 144-54 and accompanying text.
2c.4 See Q&A: Fr. Leahy, supra note 67.
265 See supra notes 144-54 and accompanying text.
266 See supra notes 144-54 and accompanying text.
20 See supra notes 144-54 and accompanying text.
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perspective that all members of the conference joined the conference
with the understanding that their duties were first to their schools, and
then to the conference. Unless any significant dealings between the
defecting schools and their new conference can be shown to have been
done as part of a plan to cause harm to the old conference, courts
should be hesitant to find that representatives from the defecting
schools breached any fiduciary duty. In addition, if a withdrawal fee
exists in the conference's constitution or a similar agreement, any po-
tential damages should be treated as subsumed into that fee, as the fee
constitutes a bargained-for liquidated damages clause that replaces any
potential damages resulting from a breach of fiduciary duty. Taking this
view of conference migration issues will encourage members to resolve
their disputes outside the court system, helping to ensure smoother
and quicker conference transitions.
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